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1 Introduction 
 
It is well-known that standard macroeconomic (rational) asset pricing models 
fail to account for several financial market puzzles. Mehra and Prescott (1985), in a 
framework without frictions and market imperfections, find an inconsistency 
between standard asset pricing theory and empirical evidence about financial 
markets: by using plausible preference parameters (values of the risk aversion 
parameter γ not greater than 5), standard asset pricing theory (Consumption-based 
CAPM - CCAPM) is not able to explain the large equity premium (excess equity 
return) that emerges from major industrialized economies’ financial data. On the 
other hand, if in the CCAPM we implement empirical data for the consumption 
growth rate and consumption volatility, and we use plausible values for the time 
preference and risk aversion parameters, we find that the risk-free rate is too high 
with respect to its empirical counterpart (Weil, 1989). 
Mehra and Prescott (2008) argue that "The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly, 
since much of our economic intuition is based on the very class of models that fall short so 
dramatically when confronted with financial data. It underscores the failure of paradigms 
central to financial and economic modeling to capture the characteristic that appears to make 
stocks comparatively so risky. Hence, the viability of using this class of models for any 
quantitative assessment, say, for instance, to gauge the welfare implications of alternative 
stabilization policies, is thrown open to question". 
Over the last 25 years, many attempts to resolve the puzzles have been made, 
by generalizing several key features of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model: 
alternative assumptions on preferences, survival bias, incomplete markets and 
market imperfections, stock market limited participation and problems of temporal 
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aggregation (Mehra, 2008). No one of these explanations has proved fully 
satisfactory. 
The critical point is that in standard asset pricing models (with different 
preference specifications), the time-varying risk associated with equity investments 
(which drives the equity premium) is related to the covariance (correlation) between 
equity returns and consumption growth rate. But if consumption changes are 
poorly correlated with stock returns (and this is what emerges from the data) we 
have no guarantee that consumption falls as stock returns decline: therefore, there is 
no increase in risk aversion and in the equity premium demanded for holding 
stocks in equilibrium. 
Hence, what appears to be necessary in standard asset pricing models is a 
factor able to generate changes in risk aversion independently (totally or partially) 
of consumption fluctuations. But we know that in standard “rational” models utility 
functions are defined over consumption levels. Habit formation models introduce 
the possibility of time-varying risk aversion, but they reach outcomes only partially 
satisfactory (and in particular in the set-up proposed by Campbell and Cochrane, 
1999). So, the basic question to be addressed is whether there is the possibility to 
have an investor which gets utility from a source different than consumption and, at 
the same time, an investor which has a time-varying risk aversion, independently of 
consumption changes. 
Recent behavioral finance/economics models try to provide an answer, by 
departing from the assumption of perfect rationality of economic agents. Starting 
from relevant experimental evidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), these models 
introduce the concept of bounded rationality and then derive several interesting 
implications. A strand of this literature adopts the basic idea that economic agents 
derive utility not only from consumption but also from fluctuations in their 
financial (equity) wealth (prospect theory - Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In 
particular, these fluctuations affect investor’s risk aversion, independently of their 
correlation with consumption dynamics. Moreover, individual preferences are 
characterized by the so-called loss aversion: economic agent is more sensitive to 
reductions in his wealth than to increases of the same magnitude. 
In this paper we study the quantitative implications of a “behavioral” asset 
pricing model along the lines proposed in a recursive utility framework by Barberis 
and Huang (2009) (henceforth, BH model/approach). In this approach investors 
give more importance to possible setbacks in their financial wealth than to the 
possibility to take profitable investment opportunities: this fact, combined with the 
narrow framing of risks, makes equity investments very risky and therefore investors 
demand a large equity premium in equilibrium. In order to test the validity of such 
approach when compared with financial data, we numerically solve a simple 
dynamic representative-agent asset pricing model with loss aversion/narrow 
framing preferences. 
In doing so, Barberis and Huang (2008, 2009) provide only a few short 
illustrative applications relative to U.S. data: they do not compare the predictions of 
their model with other countries’ financial market data. We agree to the view that a 
theoretical model that attempts to match the empirical evidence about phenomena 
such as the equity premium and risk-free rate cannot be tested only by using the 
data of a single economy, although very relevant as the U.S. one. Recent empirical 
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works show that every economy and every stock market can be characterized by a 
peculiar story that heavily affects its empirical performances (Brown, Goetzmann 
and Ross, 1995; Jorion and Goetzmann, 1999). Therefore it is important to test the 
model also with financial data of other industrialized economies (with less-
developed stock markets), in order to have the opportunity to uncover potential 
heterogeneous behaviors among the various countries. We do that in this work, by 
applying the model to U.S., UK, Italy, Germany, France and Japan. Our empirical 
results show that the BH approach seems to be robust also when it is applied to 
countries other than U.S. 
Moreover, Barberis and Huang (2008, 2009) do not attempt “to infer” exact 
plausible values for the so-called “narrow framing degree”. Instead, as a second 
step, we reverse the basic problem by solving numerically the same model in order 
to assess the exact values of the narrow framing degree that rationalize the observed 
empirical values of the equity premium and risk-free rate. We find that such narrow 
framing values are generally quite small and usually not greater than 0.24 (with the 
exception of several outliers greater than 1 for Germany); moreover, they are in line 
with seminal works on asset pricing models with loss aversion/narrow framing 
preferences. 
Finally, our numerical results show that there is an interesting and conflicting 
relationship between the risk aversion parameter and the narrow framing degree in 
affecting the risk-free rate dynamics. In fact, the simultaneous increase of these 
parameters affects the behavior of the risk-free interest rate in an opposite way. We 
know that in the CCAPM, for values consistent with a plausible parameterization of 
individual preferences, the increase in risk aversion implies, as a net effect, the 
increase in the interest rate (Campbell, 2003): the growth of current consumption 
“wins” over the precautionary saving motive. On the other hand, the increase in the 
narrow framing parameter lowers safe returns, because of the increase in stock 
market risk which implies an increase in the purchase of safe assets and therefore a 
reduction in interest rates. The crucial point is that the last effect, by adding to the 
precautionary saving one, is able to overturn the “standard” effect related to the 
increase in risk aversion, by lowering the risk-free rate: as a final result, the model is 
able to match the empirical evidence. 
The present work can be seen as a further contribution to the study of the role 
and importance of behavioral preference parameters in explaining the individual 
financial decision making processes more strictly related to individual psychology 
and irrationality. 
 
 
2    Financial wealth fluctuations and narrow framing 
 
2.1     Theoretical basics 
 
In traditional models1 the economic agent typically adopts the following 
behavior: he merges the new choices he faces with those already faced, then he 
                                                 
1
 We refer to models based on traditional Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, defined on consumption 
and/or wealth. 
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controls if the new “gamble” improve or not the future distribution of wealth 
and/or consumption. But starting with the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981), experimental evidence on financial decision-making under risk has shown 
that individuals often do not behave as in traditional models. In many cases, when 
people evaluate risk, they often engage in narrow framing: that is, they often evaluate 
risks in isolation, separately from other risks they are already facing. As remarked 
by Barberis and Huang (2009), “…… narrow framing means that, when an agent is 
deciding whether to accept a gamble, he uses a utility function that depends directly on the 
outcome of the gamble, not just indirectly via the gamble’s contribution to his total wealth”. 
The classic proof of such behavior is due to the paper of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981). Their work points out a clear contradiction: economic agents are 
faced with two concurrent decisions and they make a sub-optimal choice, opting for 
a dominated strategy. What happens is that instead of focusing on the combined 
outcome of the two decisions (i.e. on the outcome that determines their final 
wealth), individuals focus on the outcome of each decision separately. 
There are different situations where we can find a similar individual behavior. 
For example, we can think about stock market non-participation and the equity 
home bias: in both cases profitable portfolio diversification opportunities are 
rejected. 
Kahneman (2003) argues that when an agent evaluates a new gamble, the 
distribution of the gamble, separately considered, is much more “accessible” than 
the distribution of his overall wealth once the new gamble has been merged with his 
other risks. The expression “accessible” refers to the fact that many decisions are 
based on easily interpretable information; and this consideration is based on the 
idea that many choices are made intuitively rather than through effortful reasoning. 
Consistently with the explanation of Kahneman (2003) and in support of it, we 
can recall the seminal contribution provided by Simon (1982). Simon remarks that 
individuals’ cognitive resources are limited: this element forces individuals to 
simplify the space of the choice problem, which appears unmanageable for his 
excessive complexity. 
On these premises, we can naturally think of financial markets as a field where 
we can apply the theoretical approach we are discussing about. In fact, few sectors 
of human activity are characterized by a so huge quantity of information as it occurs 
in stock markets (Slovic, 1972). Such information is highly accessible by everyone 
because it can be daily reached by means of newspapers, tv-news, internet, etc. But 
the crucial point here is the correct and optimal processing of information. 
As argued in Magi (2009), the coming of new technologies, providing quickly 
information about world stock market movements, has highly contributed to 
increase individuals’ difficulties in exploiting at the maximum the huge amount of 
information available to them. In fact, although a large amount of information 
means more accuracy in evaluating alternative choices, as argued by Simon (1982), 
an amount of information in excess, given the individual’s bounded cognitive 
resources, makes the decision space unmanageable; and in order to simplify this 
space, economic agents make narrow framing (and not “overall”) evaluations. As a 
consequence, this behavior implies that individuals make the choice that is 
apparently the best one. The overall evaluation of the problem would lead to a better 
choice than that effectively made, but the lack of the “optimal” skills in processing 
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information leads to the sub-optimal choice. The overall framing is involuntary 
declined in favor of the narrow one because of the lack of such optimal skills in 
processing information. We observe that this framework is in line with recent works 
on the so-called “rational inattention” (Sims, 2003; Reis, 2005) and it can rationalize 
a key assumption in Sims (2003): individuals only devote small fractions of their 
capacity in observing and processing information. 
In this work we will use a representative agent model and this fact could have 
a not negligible impact on aggregation issues. By using a representative agent 
model, we are implicitly assuming that individual narrow framing preferences hold 
in the aggregate too. It seems plausible that if all individuals have preferences 
characterized by the same degree of narrow framing and loss aversion, by 
aggregating such individuals the same type of preferences should be preserved. 
Obviously in this way we rule out the possibility of heterogeneity in individual 
preferences and abilities to process information. 
More generally, regarding the relationship between narrow framing and asset 
prices in a full equilibrium setting, Barberis and Huang (2009) argue that first it is 
important to think carefully about where, if anywhere, narrow framing is likely to 
have a significant impact on asset prices. One way to think about this is to consider 
a model more ambitious than the one that we will actually adopt in the next sub-
section, namely a heterogeneous agent model with two groups of investors, where 
one group consists of standard expected utility (EU) maximizers while investors in 
the second group are narrow framers. In such a model, the narrow framers are 
unlikely to have much of an effect on the prices of assets with close substitutes - if 
they did, that would present an attractive opportunity for the EU investors, who 
would then trade aggressively against the narrow framers, reducing their impact on 
prices. On the other hand, narrow framers would have a more significant impact on 
the prices of assets without close substitutes - in this case, it would be much riskier 
for the EU agents to trade against them. 
 But Barberis and Huang stress the fact that, at the moment, a tractable way of 
analyzing a formal heterogeneous agent model of this kind does not exist.2 Then, a 
possible approach, as in many other lines of asset pricing research, is to start by 
studying a homogeneous agent model. In taking this approach, we need to be 
careful to pick an application where the prediction of the homogeneous agent 
model is at least qualitatively similar to the prediction of the more realistic 
heterogeneous agent model. With this goal, in this paper we take the equity 
premium as our application (as done in Barberis and Huang, 2008, 2009). If narrow 
framing affects the equity premium in a homogeneous agent model, it is likely to 
also affect the equity premium in a heterogeneous agent model: since the aggregate 
stock market does not have a close substitute, it would be too risky for EU 
maximizers to trade aggressively against the narrow framers. The effect of the 
narrow framers on the equity premium would therefore remain intact, at least in 
part. 
                                                 
2
 Gabaix (2008) assumes the possible existence of at least two types of agents in the real world: prospect theory 
(narrow framing) investors (individuals) and expected utility investors (institutions). Then, he suggests the first 
steps of a possible analytical framework for incorporating these features into the BH approach. The proposal of 
Gabaix can be an interesting starting point for future research along this direction. 
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Even if the implications of a homogeneous agent model for the equity 
premium are qualitatively similar to those of a heterogeneous agent model, we must 
acknowledge that they may be quantitatively different. Even if EU maximizers 
cannot fully reverse the effect of narrow framers on the pricing of the aggregate 
stock market, they may partially offset it. As such, Barberis and Huang (2009) 
conclude that “the equity premium that we obtain in a homogeneous agent economy should 
be thought of as an upper bound on the equity premium that we would obtain in a more 
realistic heterogeneous agent economy”. 
 
 
2.2    The Barberis-Huang (BH) approach: the basic model 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) [BHS henceforth] propose a new approach 
in order to solve some financial market puzzles. They introduce a new source of 
utility for the representative agent, besides the usual one (levels of consumption). 
The basic idea is the following: economic agents derive utility not only from 
consumption but also directly from fluctuations in the value of their financial 
wealth, and such fluctuations heavily affect investors’ risk aversion, regardless of 
their correlation with consumption growth. This idea has its origins in the seminal 
work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which introduced the so-called prospect 
theory, based on prospect-type utility: economic agent derives utility not from 
consumption/wealth levels but from their changes, evaluated with respect to a 
reference level. Therefore the utility function is defined on gains and losses and 
captures the so-called loss aversion, i.e. the fact that the agent is more sensitive to 
reductions in his wealth rather than to increases of the same magnitude. 
Obviously, this approach is in contrast with standard asset pricing models,3 
which assume that economic agents only care of their future utility deriving from 
consumption levels. But in the economic literature there are many contributions 
that, by means of theoretical arguments and experimental works, show that 
standard explanations of individual attitudes towards risk are widely questionable 
and often wrong (see Rabin, 1998, 2002). As stressed by Rabin (2002), “….Our 
attitudes towards risk are driven instead primarily by attitudes towards change in wealth 
levels.” In the BHS approach, the motivating idea is that after a big loss in the stock 
market, the investor may experience a sense of regret over his decision to invest in 
stocks. As a consequence, “he may interpret this loss as a sign that he is a second-rate 
investor, thus dealing his ego a painful blow; and he may feel humiliation in front of friends 
and family when word leaks out” (Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001). 
The BHS model has been modified by the same authors in a subsequent 
contribution (we refer to it as “BH model”). The analytical novelty introduced by 
Barberis and Huang (2009) is the use of recursive utility (Epstein-Zin-Weil utility)4 
in its standard formulation, 
 
                                                ( ))(, 1+= ttt UCWU µ                                                (1) 
 
                                                 
3
 For extensive survey articles on CCAPM models see Campbell (2003) and Kocherlakota (1996). 
4
 See Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989). 
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where )( 1+tUµ  is the certainty equivalence of future utility 1+tU , given the time t 
information. The function )(•W  is an aggregator which combines future utility 1+tU  
with current consumption tC  in order to generate current utility tU . Usually, in this 
kind of literature, the aggregator function assumes the CES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) form, 
 
                                            [ ]ρρρ ββ 1)1(),( xCxCW +−=                            (2)     
 
with 10 << β , 10 <≠ ρ , while for the certainty equivalence we assume a functional 
form with homogeneity of degree one, 
                                          
                                                )()( xkkx µµ = , 0>k . 
 
By adopting the BH preference formulation, the maximization problem of the 
representative investor modifies as follows: 
 
                          Max   [ ]( ))()(, 1,01 ++ += tStttt GvEbUCWU µ                    (3) 
 
                          s.t.               1,1 )( ++ −= tWttt RCWW                                             (4) 
                                       
where                               [ ]ρρρ ββ 1)1(),( xCxCW +−=                       (5) 
 
                                         
[ ]δδµ 1)()( xEx = ,      10 <≠ δ                                    (6) 
 
                                       
, 1 , , 1( )( )S t S t t t S t fG W C R Rθ+ += − −                             (7) 
 
                                    ( ) Gv G
Gλ

= 

     for     
0
0
G
G
≥
<
       1>λ                           (8) 
 
We can have two (or more) financial assets: for example a risky asset (equity) with 
gross rate of return 
, 1 , 11S t S tR r+ += +  between t and t+1, and a risk-free asset with safe 
return fR ; tS ,θ  is the fraction of post-consumption wealth invested in the risky 
asset. 
, 1W tR +  measures the return on the overall individual wealth, i.e. on the 
individual’s “market portfolio”, between t and t+1. Obviously, the composition of 
this portfolio depends on the number of assets we take into account. In general, we 
could also consider n  assets. 
The first term of the utility function (3) is what we usually find in standard 
asset pricing models. The novelty is the second term, 1( )tv G + , which represents 
utility deriving from individual stock wealth changes: in other words, utility 
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deriving from fluctuations in individual’s risky financial wealth.5 In particular, 1tG +  
is the gain or loss obtained by the agent on his equity investments between t and 
t+1. The utility (disutility) deriving to the investor from this gain (loss) is measured 
by the function )(•v . We note that we have both the narrow framing of risks, 
introduced by the presence of )(•v , and the loss aversion, introduced by the 
particular (piecewise linear) form of )(•v . Figure 1 makes clear the fundamental 
feature of representative agent’s preferences, the loss aversion, i.e. the higher 
sensitivity to stock wealth setbacks rather than to increases of the same magnitude. 
As we can see by (7), the reference level for measuring the gain/loss is given 
by the initial value of risky financial asset parameterized with the risk-free asset. 
The idea is that investor will be satisfied if 
, 1S t fR R+ >  and unsatisfied vice versa 
(BHS, 2001). Finally, the certainty equivalence has been specified in a very simple 
form (equation 6), widely used in the literature. 
 
 
Utility function with loss aversion 
 
                                                )(•v  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
                                                                                                     1tG +  
                                                                                          (Gain/Loss) 
                                                                         
 
                                                
                                               
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
In this context, another crucial issue is the frequency by which the investor 
evaluates his financial situation, checking his stock market performances. Following 
the results obtained by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang and Santos 
(2001) consider “the year” as standard evaluation period. The time horizon of equity 
investments is usually longer, 3-5 years, but it is reasonable assuming that economic 
                                                 
5
 We only consider risky asset fluctuations: the time t+1 risk-free return is known with certainty at time t, and 
therefore there is no risk in the changes of the safe asset. 
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agent seriously checks his financial market performances at least once a year. This 
assumption is confirmed by some elements: we file taxes once a year, receive our 
most comprehensive mutual fund reports once a year, and institutional investors 
scrutinize their money managers’ performances most carefully on an annual basis. 
What about 0b ? In the BH model this parameter plays a very important role. It 
is a non-negative parameter which permits us to control for the importance of utility 
deriving from financial wealth changes when compared with the utility deriving 
from consumption. At the same time, 0b  can also be interpreted as the narrow 
framing degree of a risky investment. If we set 00 =b  we have the standard 
consumption-based asset pricing model. 
 
 
3     First-order optimality conditions 
 
We consider a simple representative agent economy in general equilibrium, 
where preferences are described by equations (3) – (8). We consider the presence of 
three assets: a risk-free financial asset in zero net supply, and two risky assets, the 
stock market (S) and a non-financial (N) asset (human capital or housing wealth), 
both in positive net supply. The overall wealth return , of equation (4) is 
therefore the following: 
 ( )ftNtStNtNtStStW RRRR )1( ,,1,,1,,1, θθθθ −−++= +++ . 
 
In line with Barberis and Huang (2008, 2009) we assume that γδρ −== 1 ,6 
where γ  has the usual meaning. In this way we get 
 
                             [ ] γγγ ββ −−− +−= 1111)1(),( xCxCW  
 
                       and             [ ] γγµ −−= 111 )()( xEx ,               10 ≠< γ  
 
The agent maximizes the function (3), which becomes as follows: 
 
               
γγ
γγγ ββ
−
−
+
−−
+
−


















++−=
1
1
1
1,0
1
1
1
1
1 )()]([)1( tSttttt GvEbUECU ,            (9) 
 
subject to the usual constraints. 
Now we consider an equilibrium where: 
 
                                                 
6
 This assumption is standard in the literature. It implies that the separation between risk aversion and 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lost, but in our setting this is not a problem. 
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1) the risk-free rate is a constant fR ; 
2) consumption and equity returns grow over time according to the following log-
returns: 
 
                                           1,
1 )log( ++ += tCCC
t
t g
C
C
εσ  
      
                                           1,1, )log( ++ += tSSStS gR εσ  
 
                          where   
	
,
,  ~ 	
0
0 , 
1 ,
, 1  
 
and where  and  are mean log returns (mean log growth rate for consumption) 
and standard deviations (of log stock returns and log consumption growth), , is 
the correlation between log consumption growth and log stock returns and 
stochastic shocks 
 are exogenous; 
 
3) the consumption-wealth ratio is a constant α . Hence we have 
 
                                                 
t
t
tt
t
tW C
C
CW
WR 111, 1
1 ++
+
−
=
−
=
α
 
 
and 
 
                                                  1,1, )log( ++ += tWWWtW gR εσ  
 
where     )
1
1log(
α−
+= CW gg ,     CW σσ =    and   1,1, ++ = tCtW εε . 
 
4) the fraction of total wealth invested in the stock market is constant over time: 
 
                                                    S
tt
t
tS NS
S θθ =
+
=
,
,   t∀  
 
where tS  is total equity wealth and tN  is total non-financial wealth. 
Barberis and Huang (2009) show that with these assumptions, the first order 
conditions of optimality are the following: 
 
                     
γ
γ
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where ttt WC /≡α  is the consumption-wealth ratio. By exploiting the assumptions 1–
4, equations (10) - (12) can be modified further as follows:7 
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with 
S
Sf
S
gR
σ
ε
−
=
)log(
ˆ  and where )(⋅N  is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution.8 
                                                 
7
 For details see the Mathematical Appendix A. 
8
 See the Mathematical Appendix B. 
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Now, given some parameter values, and in particular those that describe 
individual preferences, we can solve the equations (13) – (15) finding the unknowns 
α , fR  e Sg , in order to determine the riskfree interest rate and the equity premium 
generated by the model.9 We note that in our framework the equity premium is 
given by 
 
                                                      ftSt rrEEP −= + )( 1,  
 
We know that  
 
                                   ⇒+=+≡ +++ 1,1,1, )1log()log( tSSStStS grR εσ  
 
                                                11,1, −=⇒ +
+
+
tSSSg
tS er
εσ
, 
 
then, taking the expected values at time t on both sides we have 
 
                                                1)( 21,
2
−=
+
+
S
Sg
tSt erE
σ
 
 
In deriving the expression above we exploit the fact that if a random variable x  has 
a standard normal distribution then 
 
                                                    
2
2( )
b
a
a bxE e e
++
= . 
 
Once we have found fR  and Sg  in the three-equation system (13) - (15), we can 
find the equity premium according to the following expression: 
 
                                    f
g
f
g
RereEP
S
S
S
S
−=−−=
++
22
22
)1(
σσ
.                              (16) 
 
 
4     Quantitative implications of the model: matching the empirical 
evidence 
 
In this section we numerically solve (by working on first order optimality 
conditions) the simple dynamic representative-agent asset pricing model outlined 
above, with the aim to match the empirical evidence observed in industrialized 
economies about the equity premium and the riskfree rate. We exploit the results 
provided by the numerical solution of equations (13) – (15) in order to test the 
validity of the BH model. 
Then, as a second step, in the next section we reverse the problem by solving 
the same model in order to infer the “exact” levels of the narrow framing degree 
                                                 
9
 The solution of equations (13) – (15) is run with MatLab. Codes are available upon request by the author. 
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which are coherent with the observed empirical values of the equity premium and 
risk-free rate. 
Barberis and Huang (2008, 2009) provide only a few short illustrative 
applications relative to U.S. data. Here we will see how the model behaves when it 
is compared with financial data of other countries; we analyse the cases of U.S., UK, 
Italy, Germany, France and Japan. 
In Table 1 we have the empirical values of the equity premium and riskfree 
rate to which we will refer for evaluating the ability of the model in matching the 
data, while Table 2 shows consumption dynamics and stock return parameters that 
will be implemented in the model. We use data drawn from Campbell (2003), for 
the time periods reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
Concerning preference parameters ( β , γ , λ ), we implement values that are 
consistent with the most important results found in the theoretical and empirical 
literature (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Kocherlakota, 1996; Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003; Magi, 2007, 2009). This holds also for the numerical exercises we will 
run in section 5. 
For β  and γ  we use values largely used in the prevailing literature 
(Kocherlakota, 1996, Campbell, 2003, Barberis and Huang, 2008, 2009), keeping in 
mind that regarding risk aversion parameter there is much controversy in the 
literature. Kocherlakota (1996) summarizes the prevailing view by observing that “a 
vast majority of economists believe that values of  above ten (or, for that matter, 
above five) imply highly implausible behavior on the part of individuals.” This 
consideration is a reference to the arguments of Pratt (1964), which claims that risk 
aversion parameter has to be not greater than 3 (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004, 
chapter 13). For the intertemporal discount factor β  we take in all cases a value 
equal to 0.98, which corresponds to a time preference (intertemporal discount rate) 
equal to 0.02. However,  has little effect on attitudes to risk and setting it to 0.98 
ensures that the risk-free rate is not too high. 
Concerning 0b , in the present section we use a range of different values, in 
order to verify the behavior of the model as the level of narrow framing varies. We 
remark that at the moment there are only a few research articles where we can find 
plausible attempts to estimate the narrow framing degree.10 The same consideration 
holds for the loss aversion parameter, but in this case the literature is more 
developed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Berkelaar, 
Kouwenberg and Post, 2004; Gomes, 2005). 
Finally, about the calibration of Sθ , we take values which are close to data 
drawn from households’ wealth of the various countries and however we remark 
that the results are quite similar over a range of values of . 
 
A) U.S. 
 
We start with the case of U.S., with data of the period 1891-1998 (drawn from 
Campbell, 2003). We solve the model by taking a value of Sθ  equal to 0.25 (see 
                                                 
10
 We will attempt to provide a contribution in this direction in the next section. However, Guiso (2009) 
provides a first interesting approach to the econometric estimate of the narrow framing degree. 
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Table 2), but we would obtain quantitatively similar results by using slightly 
different values, for example 0.20 or 0.30 (as done by Barberis and Huang, 2008, 
2009).11 
First, we observe that the cases with the parameter triples (γ , λ , 0b ) = (1.5, 3, 
0) and (γ , λ , 0b ) = (3, 3, 0) have not been reported because we have the same 
results obtained with 25.2=λ : when 00 =b  the value of λ  becomes completely 
insignificant because it goes out of the model (see equations 14 and 15). From Table 
3 we see that the model is able to produce a large equity premium together with a 
low risk-free rate, in accord with the empirical evidence. In particular, we highlight 
the possibility to get low interest rates and large equity premiums (by means of the 
raise in 1, +tSt rE  and therefore Sg ) by increasing the narrow framing degree 0b . 
Obviously, with the same level of , this behavior will be stronger as much as loss 
aversion λ  will be higher. Our results about U.S. are in line with Barberis and 
Huang (2008, 2009). 
The mechanism in action is that previously discussed in section 2. If investor 
derives utility also directly from changes in his equity wealth, and, via the 
parameter λ , is more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude, he 
finds the stock market particularly risky: hence, in order to hold equities in 
equilibrium, he wants to be compensated by a high risk premium. At the same time, 
the narrow framing made on the stock market and the strong aversion towards 
financial setbacks (loss aversion) imply an increasing demand for safe risk-free 
assets and the deferment of consumption to the future: this explains the reduction in 
risk-free rates. We note that interest rate declines as we introduce narrow framing 
and loss aversion in the model (i.e. when 0b  is different from zero), but also, by 
keeping γ  and 0b  constant, when we raise the level of loss aversion λ . This fact 
also holds for the increase in the equity premium. 
Moreover, what is evident is that the effects on interest rate and equity 
premium are remarkable in particular at a first step of the introduction of behavioral 
(narrow framing) preferences, i.e. when we shift from a narrow framing degree 
equal to zero (standard asset pricing model) to a level of 0.05: for higher levels of 
narrow framing the effect is still present but it seems to appear with less intensity. 
This point will be more evident and clear in the next section. 
When the narrow framing degree is zero we collapse to the standard model 
and the only preference parameter that matters (together with ) is consumption 
risk aversion . In this case equations (13) – (15) become the following 
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 We note that this observation holds for all cases we will see. 
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and what said above (we come back to the standard model) should be more clear. 
From Table 3 we can see that with 00 =b , increasing values of γ  imply slightly 
increasing values of the equity premium, but in particular, consistently with 
standard theory, they imply a substantial increase in fr . The increase in risk 
aversion means that economic agent becomes more reluctant to substitute 
consumption in different states of the world and, at the same time, the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (EIS) decreases:12 investor prefers current consumption 
over future consumption and for increasing current consumption he has to borrow, 
pushing up interest rates. Keep in mind that an increase in  also induces a higher 
demand for risk-free financial assets (precautionary saving), with the consequent 
increase in their prices and decrease in their interest rates; but at the same time, the 
effect related to current consumption growth turns out to be prevailing: as a net 
final effect the risk-free rate goes up.13 
 
 
B) UK 
 
Let’s see the case of UK (for the period 1919-1998). As shown in Table 4, the 
qualitative behavior of the model is similar to that of the U.S. case. The introduction 
of the narrow framing of risks and of loss aversion imply a reduction in riskfree rate 
and an increase in the equity premium. In particular, in correspondence of the 
parameter triple (γ , λ , 0b ) = (1.5, 3, 0.05), we are able to match almost perfectly the 
“benchmark” empirical values (reported in Table 1). Also in this case, as done 
above, we have omitted to analyse cases as the parameter triple (γ , λ , 0b ) = (1.5, 3, 
0), because with no narrow framing we find the same outcomes of the case with (γ , 
λ , 0b ) = (1.5, 2.25, 0). 
In the third part of Table 4 we have implemented higher values of 0b  than that 
calibrated in the US case: the idea is to stress the fact that when  shifts from 1.5 to 3, 
if the level of loss aversion λ  remains at 2.25, even marked increases of the narrow 
framing degree beyond a given threshold are not enough for reducing significantly 
fr . In fact, increasing loss aversion as well becomes necessary: with λ  equal to 3 
(see the last part of Table 4) the model produces, together with a large equity 
premium, even a negative safe interest rate, and this with “moderate” levels of 
narrow framing. This means that, beyond certain levels, the narrow framing degree 
tends to lose its importance and to reduce its impact on interest rates and equity 
returns. 
                                                 
12
 We remember that, despite the use of recursive preferences, the negative relation between EIS and risk 
aversion is still a characteristic of the model, given the starting assumptions ( =  = 1 − ): the value of EIS 
decreases as risk aversion increases and vice versa. 
13
 Obviously, this relationship holds for values not so high of the risk aversion parameter  (Campbell, 2003). 
When the value of   is very high (for example greater than 15), i.e. absolutely implausible, the precautionary 
saving motive wins over the current consumption growth one, and the risk-free rate declines. 
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Finally, we note another interesting behavior of the model: an increase in risk 
aversion , by keeping constant the other preference parameters, is not always 
followed by an increase in risk-free rate, as standard theory predicts. In particular, 
when 00 ≠b  and 3=λ , from  Table 4 we see that in several cases increases in γ  
imply a reduction in fr . For example, we have 
 
                                        (γ , λ , 0b ) = (1.5, 3, 0.05)   ⇒    %17.1=fr   
 
                     and            (γ , λ , 0b ) = (3, 3, 0.05)      ⇒    %34.0−=fr  
 
or in alternative, 
 
                                        (γ , λ , 0b ) = (1.5, 3, 0.10)   ⇒    %90.0=fr   
 
                      and           (γ , λ , 0b ) = (3, 3, 0.10)      ⇒    %47.0−=fr  
 
The crucial point is that the presence of 0b , accompanied by a relative high 
level of loss aversion, implies a decreasing impact of γ  on fr . In other words, for 
growing values of 0b  the positive effect of risk aversion on interest rates tends to 
diminish, up to becoming negative. But if we consider the question carefully, this 
fact is perfectly consistent with the basic idea of narrow framing preferences, where 
a critical role is assigned to the framing of risks “in isolation” and to equity losses in 
affecting investors’ financial choices. With regard to the effects on the risk-free rate, 
the negative effect introduced by the narrow framing of risks turn out to be slightly 
stronger than the positive effect of risk aversion γ . 
 
 
C) ITALY 
 
In this case we have outcomes over a limited time period, 1971-1998. As we 
will see, the Italian case is very similar to the Japanese one. Table 1 shows that for 
such countries we have empirical values of the equity premium not so large as in 
other cases. However, they are values not in accordance with standard theory 
(CCAPM) and therefore contribute to the equity premium puzzle. On these 
premises, it will be coherent to expect the Italian case to be partially different from 
the general tendency, which globally confirms the validity of the BH approach, i.e. 
its ability to match empirical financial data of major industrialized economies. Table 
5 shows the results obtained for Italy. 
They are not so good as in the U.S. and UK cases. The overall tendency is that 
expected, but the problem is to get an interest rate close to its empirical value and at 
the same time an equity premium not so large and close to the empirical evidence. 
For example, with the parameter triple (γ , λ , 0b ) = (3, 2.25, 0.05), we are able to get 
EP = 4.66%, but such a result is not much significant since it is obtained with an 
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interest rate equal to 6.73%. In other words, when the model matches the risk-free 
rate, it is not able to make the same thing with the equity premium. 
On the other hand, the Italian case, for different structural factors, is not so 
easily comparable to the cases of U.S. and UK, and more generally, to English-
speaking countries. Some notable examples of such differences are the historical 
poor individual attitude toward equity investments, the capital market and 
portfolio structure, etc.14 In Italy the equity investment culture is very recent, at the 
contrary of English-speaking countries, where since many years there exists a 
higher financial culture and a stronger propensity in using some financial 
products.15 Hence, it seems to be plausible that the BH approach, given its 
distinctive characteristics, is suitable for the Italian reality only approximately. 
 
 
D) GERMANY 
 
The basic outcomes for Germany are reported in Table 6. The BH model seems 
to work well: there is the possibility to generate a large equity premium and 
meanwhile a low risk-free rate, both close to their empirical values. As we can see, 
the best results are obtained with 3=λ . Finally, we note that as already seen for US 
and UK, in some cases (see first section of Table 6) an increase in 0b  beyond certain 
levels has negligible effects on  interest rates and equity premiums. 
 
 
E) FRANCE 
 
Also in this case we have outcomes consistent with the empirical evidence (see 
Table 7): an increase in the narrow framing degree implies a reduction of fr  and an 
increase in the risk premium demanded by investors for holding stocks in 
equilibrium. Moreover, regarding the effects on interest rates, as already observed 
for UK, also in this case the increase in 0b  offsets the raise in the risk aversion 
parameter, with a negative final effect (i.e., the risk-free rate declines). 
 
 
F) JAPAN 
 
As already mentioned above (see the case of Italy), also for Japan we have 
results partially at odds with the basic idea of the BH approach. In Table 8 we have 
reported the most important results which point out that this case presents more 
problems than the Italian one in satisfying the predictions of the BH approach. As 
remarked for Italy, also in this case there are some difficulties in generating 
                                                 
14
 For an analysis of the differences between Italy and U.S. in term of financial market participation and 
household wealth, see for example Faiella and Neri (2004). 
15
 There are many works that emphasize the importance of the diffusion of a certain level of financial culture 
and literacy, in order to further encourage the development of some countries’ stock markets and to increase the 
possibility of convenient financial portfolio diversification. See for example Haliassos and Hassapis (2001) and 
Alessie, Lusardi and Van Rooij (2007). 
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simultaneously a large equity premium and a low risk-free rate. Moreover, this task 
is complicated by the fact that in the Japanese case the interest rate is lower (one 
percentage point) than in the Italian case. 
 
The analysis of the results presented above allows to state that, overall, the BH 
approach seems to be robust also for financial data of countries different than U.S. 
However, the aspects to be emphasized here are two. 
First, the possibility for economic agents to get direct utility not only from 
consumption but also from fluctuations in their financial (equity) wealth, combined 
with loss aversion, contributes to improve the performances of frictionless and 
complete markets models in explaining the actual empirical behavior of the equity 
risk premium and risk-free rate. 
The second point to be highlighted, which is not present in Barberis and 
Huang (2008, 2009), is the relationship between the risk aversion parameter γ  and 
the narrow framing degree 0b . Our numerical results show that there is a conflicting 
relationship between the risk aversion parameter and the narrow framing degree. In 
fact, the simultaneous increase of these parameters affects the behavior of the risk-
free interest rate in an opposite way. We know that in the CCAPM, for values 
consistent with a plausible parameterization of individual preferences, the increase 
in risk aversion implies, as a net effect, the increase in the interest rate (Campbell, 
2003): the growth of current consumption “wins” over the precautionary saving 
motive. On the other hand, the increase in the narrow framing parameter lowers 
safe returns, because of the increase in stock market risk which implies an increase 
in the purchase of safe assets and therefore a reduction in interest rates. The crucial 
point is that the last effect, by adding to the precautionary saving one, is able to 
overturn the “standard” effect related to the increase in risk aversion: as a final 
result, the model is able to match the empirical evidence. 
However, the necessity and the importance of investigating the investors’ 
narrow framing degree from different perspectives appears to be evident, in order 
to further verify the role and weight of narrow framing in economic agents’ 
cognitive decision-making processes. 
 
 
5    Assessing the exact level of the narrow framing degree 
 
In this section we reverse the problem analysed above, and given the values of 
some preference parameters, we solve equations (13) and (14) in the unknowns   
and !". In this case equation (15) is redundant: we have two unknowns, hence two 
equations are enough. Obviously, we are particularly interested into the narrow 
framing degree and not into the value of  . The basic idea is to find the exact levels 
of !" that rationalize the observed empirical values of the equity premium and risk-
free rate. 
From equation (16) we know that 
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Given the empirical value of the equity premium (EP) and the riskfree (gross) rate 
# = 1 + %#, we have that 
 
 = ln()* + #+ − 
,
2  
                        
With the value of  calculated according to the previous expression and the 
empirical value of #, we are able to numerically solve equations (13) - (14) in order 
“to infer” the “optimal” value of the narrow framing degree !". 
Tables 10-15 report outcomes derived from quantitative applications relative 
to U.S., UK, Italy, Germany, France and Japan (see Table 9 for parameter values 
implemented in solving equations 13-14). We remark the fact that in some cases we 
have no acceptable solution for !" because the solution turns out to be negative, and 
since !" is by definition a non-negative parameter such a solution is not significant. 
For the U.S. economy we note that with risk aversion () constant, the level of 
the narrow framing degree declines as the loss aversion increases (see Table 10). 
This is consistent with theoretical predictions: when loss aversion raises, the narrow 
framing degree needed to obtain a given equity premium may be declining, because 
equity investments are already perceived as particularly risky by means of the 
increase in λ . 
By comparing the results obtained with the same value of the loss aversion 
parameter but with different levels of risk aversion, we see that the implied narrow 
framing parameter declines as the level of risk aversion increases. This relationship 
makes sense according to intuition and basic theory and it is a feature of investors’ 
behavior not only for U.S. but also for UK and Japan (see Table 11 and 15). 
In fact, we observe that the same numerical exercise with UK and Japanese 
data provides very similar outcomes. The first regularity of the U.S. case is 
confirmed (inverse relationship between !" and λ  with  constant), and this holds 
also for the second regularity: by keeping loss aversion constant, as  increases the 
implied narrow framing degree declines (with similar values for U.S. and UK, with 
smaller values for Japan). 
Otherwise, Italy and France share some peculiar results (see Tables 12 and 14). 
In these two cases, with constant risk aversion !" declines as loss aversion raises, as 
for U.S., UK and Japan, but with λ  constant, !" slightly increases as risk aversion 
raises; this last behavior is different from the other three cases and might appear just 
a bit counterintuitive, but changes in !" are so small that it seems to be negligible. 
In the Italian case we have very small changes in narrow framing when we 
consider movements in risk aversion by keeping loss aversion constant. This fact 
may be interpreted as a signal that Italian investors require almost no change in 
their narrow framing degree when consumption risk aversion is increasing. About 
this point, in the French case we have a similar behavior, but with slightly larger 
changes in the narrow framing parameter. 
Finally, the case of Germany seems to be a little controversial. In every section 
of Table 13, in correspondence of λ  equal to 2.75, we have a value of !" that can be 
considered as an “outlier” if compared with the outcomes found for the other 
countries. However, further sensitivity analyses (not reported in Table 13) show that 
the strange behavior of the German case is due for the large part to the high level of 
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mean (log) stock return  (9.21%, the highest among the six countries considered 
here). For example, with risk aversion and loss aversion equal, respectively, to 3 and 
2.75, by reducing  of 1% (8.21%) we obtain !" = 0.14 (against 1.14); by reducing  
of 0.5% (8.71%) we obtain !" = 0.31. Moreover, starting from the second section of 
Table 13, the behavior of the narrow framing parameter as risk aversion increases, is 
equal to that of Italian and French investors, but by comparing the first and second 
section of Table 13 we have instead an opposite behavior, as for U.S., UK and Japan; 
anyway, movements in !" are very small.  
 
Overall, we stress the fact that the values of the narrow framing parameter that 
rationalize the observed empirical values of the equity premium and risk-free rate 
are in all cases not greater than 0.24 (with the exception of several outliers greater 
than 1 for Germany). This empirical regularity is substantially in accordance with 
the results found in section 4, and, more important, our results concerning !" are in 
line with the values implemented for several simulations in seminal works about 
asset pricing models with loss aversion/narrow framing preferences: Barberis, 
Huang and Santos (2001), Barberis and Huang (2001), Barberis, Huang and Thaler 
(2006), and very recently Barberis and Huang (2008, 2009). In such works the basic 
values of the narrow framing degree able to match empirical evidence are usually 
not greater than 1, but more often not greater than 0.50. In the papers quoted above, 
in many cases, with a value of 0.10, the model is able to match empirical evidence 
also with regard to other different stock market puzzles (equity home bias, stock 
market non-participation).16 The present work contributes further to the 
investigation of the relevance of behavioral preference parameters, in trying “to 
capture” the individual preferences more strictly related to individual psychology 
and irrationality. 
 
 
6    Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we study the quantitative implications of a “behavioral” asset 
pricing model along the lines proposed in a recursive utility framework by Barberis 
and Huang (2009) (BH approach). In particular, in order to test the validity of such 
approach when compared with financial data and stock market puzzles, we 
numerically solve a dynamic representative-agent asset pricing model with loss 
aversion/narrow framing preferences. 
Barberis and Huang (2008, 2009) do not compare the predictions of their model 
with financial market data different than U.S. ones. Moreover, they do not attempt 
“to infer” plausible parameter values for the narrow framing degree. We apply the 
model to U.S., UK, Italy, Germany, France and Japan. Our empirical results show 
that the BH approach seems to be robust also when it is applied to countries other 
than U.S. We find interesting heterogeneous behaviors between the various 
countries. 
As a second step, we reverse the basic problem by solving numerically the 
same model in order to infer the exact values of the narrow framing degree that 
                                                 
16
 About the equity home bias puzzle see also Magi (2009). 
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rationalize the observed empirical values of the equity premium and risk-free rate. 
We find that such narrow framing parameter values are generally quite small and 
however usually not greater than 0.24, with the exception of several outliers in the 
German case. 
Finally, our numerical results show that there is an interesting and conflicting 
relationship between the risk aversion parameter and the narrow framing degree in 
affecting the risk-free rate dynamics. In fact, the simultaneous increase of these 
parameters affects the behavior of the risk-free interest rate in an opposite way. We 
know that in the C-CAPM, for values consistent with a plausible parameterization 
of individual preferences, the increase in risk aversion implies, as a net effect, the 
increase in the interest rate (Campbell, 2003): the growth of current consumption 
“wins” over the precautionary saving motive. On the other hand, the increase in the 
narrow framing parameter lowers safe returns, because of the increase in stock 
market risk which implies an increase in the purchase of safe assets and therefore a 
reduction in interest rates. The crucial point is that the last effect, by adding to the 
precautionary saving one, is able to overturn the “standard” effect related to the 
increase in risk aversion: as a final result, the model produces a low risk-free rate, 
matching therefore the empirical evidence. 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  (data drawn from Campbell, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
Empirical values for the riskfree rate and equity premium 
(annual real values; arithmetic averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  (data drawn from Campbell, 2003) 
Model’s parameters, annual real values (arithmetic averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 US UK ITA GER FRA JAP 
Period 1891-1998 1919-1998 1971-1998 1978-1997 1973-1998 1970-1999 
EP  6.72% 8.67% 4.68% 8.67% 8.30% 5.10% 
fr  2.0% 1.25% 2.37% 3.22% 2.71% 1.38% 
 US UK ITA GER FRA JAP 
Period 1891-1998 1919-1998 1971-1998 1978-1997 1973-1998 1970-1999 
Cg  1.80% 1.55% 2.20% 1.68% 1.23% 3.20% 
Cσ  3.22% 2.88% 1.70% 2.43% 2.91% 2.55% 
Sσ  18.60% 22.17% 27.0% 20.10% 23.42% 21.90% 
SC ,ω  0.45 0.42 -0.033 -0.151 -0.117 0.40 
Sθ  0.25 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.20 
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Table 3 – U.S. (1891-1998) 
β  γ  λ  0b  fr  Sg  EP  
0.98 1.5 2.25 0 4.71% 3.28% 0.43% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.05 3.20% 5.65% 4.45% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.10 2.87% 6.15% 5.33% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.15 2.75% 6.34% 5.65% 
       
0.98 1.5 3 0.05 2.32% 7.0% 6.80% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.10 1.98% 7.51% 7.70% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.15 1.86% 7.68% 8.0% 
       
0.98 3 2.25 0 7.20% 6.0% 0.84% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.05 4.75% 6.77% 4.12% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.10 3.96% 7.0% 5.16% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.15 3.66% 7.10% 5.57% 
       
0.98 3 3 0.05 2.87% 7.30% 6.58% 
0.98 3 3 0.10 2.0% 7.53% 7.70% 
0.98 3 3 0.15 1.74% 7.60% 8.15% 
Our elaboration 
 
 
 
Table 4 – UK (1919-1998) 
β  γ  λ  0b  fr  Sg  EP  
0.98 1.5 2.25 0 4.34% 2.20% 0.42% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.05 2.32% 5.36% 5.81% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.10 2.0% 5.85% 6.66% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.15 1.89% 6.02% 6.95% 
       
0.98 1.5 3 0.05 1.17% 7.10% 8.85% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.10 0.90% 7.51% 9.58% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.15 0.82% 7.63% 9.80% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.50 0.71% 7.80% 10.10% 
       
0.98 3 2.25 0 6.50% 4.64% 0.85% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.05 2.90% 5.72% 5.62% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.10 2.10% 5.94% 6.66% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.50 1.55% 6.10% 7.38% 
0.98 3 2.25 2 1.47% 6.11% 7.47% 
       
0.98 3 3 0.05 -0.34% 6.58% 9.80% 
0.98 3 3 0.10 -0.47% 6.61% 9.96% 
Our elaboration 
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Table 5 - Italy (1971-1998) 
β  γ  λ  0b  fr  Sg  EP  
0.98 1.5 2.25 0 5.43% 1.62% -0.024% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.05 4.15% 5.71% 5.65% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.10 3.78% 6.84% 7.27% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.50 3.41% 7.98% 8.92% 
       
0.98 1.5 3 0.05 3.42% 7.94% 8.86% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.10 3% 9.23% 10.74% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.50 2.63% 10.33% 12.36% 
0.98 1.5 3 2 2.56% 10.54% 12.68% 
       
0.98 3 2.25 0 8.86% 4.80% -0.048% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.05 6.73% 7.14% 4.66% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.10 5.85% 8.07% 6.58% 
       
0.98 3 3 0.05 5.38% 8.56% 7.60% 
0.98 3 3 0.10 4.19% 9.78% 10.17% 
0.98 3 3 2 3% 10.96% 12.72% 
Our elaboration 
 
 
Table 6 – Germany (1978-1997) 
β  γ  λ  0b  fr  Sg  EP  
0.98 1.5 2.25 0 4.58% 2.34% -0.12% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.05 3.54% 5.70% 4.48% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.10 3.30% 6.44% 5.53% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.50 3.06% 7.20% 6.60% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 2 3.0% 7.35% 6.82% 
       
0.98 1.5 3 0.05 3.02% 7.32% 6.74% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.10 2.74% 8.18% 7.97% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.50 2.50% 8.94% 9% 
       
0.98 3 2.25 0 7% 4.55% -0.21% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.05 5.18% 6.62% 3.84% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.10 4.60% 7.27% 5.13% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.50 3.94% 7.96% 6.55% 
       
0.98 3 3 0.05 4.14% 7.75% 6.10% 
0.98 3 3 0.10 3.40% 8.53% 7.70% 
0.98 3 3 0.20 3% 8.94% 8.56% 
0.98 3 3 0.50 2.78% 9.18% 9.05% 
Our elaboration 
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Table 7 – France (1973-1998) 
β  γ  λ  0b  fr  Sg  EP  
0.98 1.5 2.25 0 3.84% 0.91% -0.12% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.05 2.48% 5.31% 5.90% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.10 2.26% 6.0% 6.87% 
       
0.98 1.5 3 0.01 2.95% 3.80% 3.80% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.03 2.10% 6.51% 7.59% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.05 1.81% 7.40% 8.86% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.10 1.58% 8.10% 9.86% 
       
0.98 3 2.25 0 5.47% 2.35% -0.25% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.05 2.79% 5.37% 5.66% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.10 2.24% 5.96% 6.85% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.50 1.82% 6.41% 7.76% 
0.98 3 2.25 2 1.75% 6.48% 7.90% 
       
0.98 3 3 0.01 4% 4% 2.97% 
0.98 3 3 0.03 1.81% 6.41% 7.77% 
0.98 3 3 0.05 1.09% 7.18% 9.33% 
0.98 3 3 0.10 0.70% 7.59% 10.18% 
Our elaboration 
 
 
Table 8 – Japan (1970-1999) 
β  γ  λ  0b  fr  Sg  EP  
0.98 1.5 2.25 0 6.98% 4.68% 0.35% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.05 5.96% 6.88% 3.76% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.10 5.53% 7.80% 5.20% 
0.98 1.5 2.25 0.50 4.96% 8.97% 7.10% 
       
0.98 1.5 3 0.05 5.33% 8.20% 5.84% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.10 4.75% 9.41% 7.78% 
0.98 1.5 3 0.50 4.13% 10.68% 9.83% 
0.98 1.5 3 2 4% 10.94% 10.26% 
       
0.98 3 2.25 0 12% 9.60% 0.75% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.05 10.44% 10.51% 3.34% 
0.98 3 2.25 0.10 9.61% 11.0% 4.72% 
       
0.98 3 3 0.05 9.45% 11.10% 5.0% 
0.98 3 3 0.10 8.20% 11.77% 7.0% 
0.98 3 3 0.50 6.48% 12.70% 9.82% 
Our elaboration 
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Table 9  (Data drawn from Campbell, 2003; our elaboration for ) 
Model’s parameters, annual real values (arithmetic averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 – U.S. (1891-1998) 
β  γ  λ  fr  EP  0b  
0.98 1.5 2.25 2.0% 6.72% --- 
0.98 1.5 2.5 2.0% 6.72% 0.20 
0.98 1.5 2.75 2.0% 6.72% 0.069 
0.98 1.5 3 2.0% 6.72% 0.041 
      
0.98 3 2.25 2.0% 6.72% --- 
0.98 3 2.5 2.0% 6.72% 0.19 
0.98 3 2.75 2.0% 6.72% 0.066 
0.98 3 3 2.0% 6.72% 0.040 
      
0.98 4 2.25 2.0% 6.72% --- 
0.98 4 2.5 2.0% 6.72% 0.19 
0.98 4 2.75 2.0% 6.72% 0.064 
0.98 4 3 2.0% 6.72% 0.039 
      
0.98 5 2.25 2.0% 6.72% --- 
0.98 5 2.5 2.0% 6.72% 0.18 
0.98 5 2.75 2.0% 6.72% 0.063 
0.98 5 3 2.0% 6.72% 0.038 
Our elaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 USA UK ITA GER FRA JAP 
Period 1891-1998 1919-1998 1971-1998 1978-1997 1973-1998 1970-1999 
EP
 
6.72% 8.67% 4.68% 8.67% 8.30% 5.10% 
fr  2.0% 1.25% 2.37% 3.22% 2.71% 1.38% 
Sg  
6.63% 7.0% 3.17% 9.21% 7.70% 3.88% 
Cσ  3.22% 2.88% 1.70% 2.43% 2.91% 2.55% 
Sσ  18.6% 22.17% 27% 20.10% 23.42% 21.90% 
SC ,ω  0.45 0.42 -0.033 -0.151 -0.117 0.40 
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Table 11 – UK (1919-1998) 
β  γ  λ  fr  EP  0b  
0.98 1.5 2.25 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 1.5 2.5 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 1.5 2.75 1.25% 8.67% 0.10 
0.98 1.5 3 1.25% 8.67% 0.044 
      
0.98 3 2.25 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 3 2.5 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 3 2.75 1.25% 8.67% 0.094 
0.98 3 3 1.25% 8.67% 0.042 
      
0.98 4 2.25 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 4 2.5 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 4 2.75 1.25% 8.67% 0.092 
0.98 4 3 1.25% 8.67% 0.041 
      
0.98 5 2.25 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 5 2.5 1.25% 8.67% --- 
0.98 5 2.75 1.25% 8.67% 0.091 
0.98 5 3 1.25% 8.67% 0.041 
Our elaboration 
 
 
 
Table 12 – Italy (1971-1998) 
β  γ  λ  fr  EP  0b  
0.98 1.5 2.25 2.37% 4.68% 0.0167 
0.98 1.5 2.5 2.37% 4.68% 0.0125 
0.98 1.5 2.75 2.37% 4.68% 0.0100 
0.98 1.5 3 2.37% 4.68% 0.0083 
      
0.98 3 2.25 2.37% 4.68% 0.0169 
0.98 3 2.5 2.37% 4.68% 0.0126 
0.98 3 2.75 2.37% 4.68% 0.0100 
0.98 3 3 2.37% 4.68% 0.0083 
      
0.98 4 2.25 2.37% 4.68% 0.0170 
0.98 4 2.5 2.37% 4.68% 0.0127 
0.98 4 2.75 2.37% 4.68% 0.0101 
0.98 4 3 2.37% 4.68% 0.0084 
      
0.98 5 2.25 2.37% 4.68% 0.0172 
0.98 5 2.5 2.37% 4.68% 0.0128 
0.98 5 2.75 2.37% 4.68% 0.0102 
0.98 5 3 2.37% 4.68% 0.0085 
Our elaboration 
 
 28 
Table 13 – Germany (1978-1997) 
β  γ  λ  fr  EP  0b  
0.98 1.5 2.25 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 1.5 2.5 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 1.5 2.75 3.22% 8.67% 1.15 
0.98 1.5 3 3.22% 8.67% 0.239 
      
0.98 3 2.25 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 3 2.5 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 3 2.75 3.22% 8.67% 1.14 
0.98 3 3 3.22% 8.67% 0.237 
      
0.98 4 2.25 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 4 2.5 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 4 2.75 3.22% 8.67% 1.15 
0.98 4 3 3.22% 8.67% 0.239 
      
0.98 5 2.25 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 5 2.5 3.22% 8.67% --- 
0.98 5 2.75 3.22% 8.67% 1.17 
0.98 5 3 3.22% 8.67% 0.242 
Our elaboration 
 
 
 
Table 14 – France (1973-1998) 
β  γ  λ  fr  EP  0b  
0.98 1.5 2.25 2.71% 8.30% --- 
0.98 1.5 2.5 2.71% 8.30% 0.190 
0.98 1.5 2.75 2.71% 8.30% 0.083 
0.98 1.5 3 2.71% 8.30% 0.053 
      
0.98 3 2.25 2.71% 8.30% --- 
0.98 3 2.5 2.71% 8.30% 0.196 
0.98 3 2.75 2.71% 8.30% 0.085 
0.98 3 3 2.71% 8.30% 0.055 
      
0.98 4 2.25 2.71% 8.30% --- 
0.98 4 2.5 2.71% 8.30% 0.199 
0.98 4 2.75 2.71% 8.30% 0.087 
0.98 4 3 2.71% 8.30% 0.056 
      
0.98 5 2.25 2.71% 8.30% --- 
0.98 5 2.5 2.71% 8.30% 0.205 
0.98 5 2.75 2.71% 8.30% 0.089 
0.98 5 3 2.71% 8.30% 0.057 
Our elaboration 
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Table 15 – Japan (1970-1999) 
β  γ  λ  fr  EP  0b  
0.98 1.5 2.25 1.38% 5.10% 0.021 
0.98 1.5 2.5 1.38% 5.10% 0.014 
0.98 1.5 2.75 1.38% 5.10% 0.0104 
0.98 1.5 3 1.38% 5.10% 0.0083 
      
0.98 3 2.25 1.38% 5.10% 0.0196 
0.98 3 2.5 1.38% 5.10% 0.013 
0.98 3 2.75 1.38% 5.10% 0.0097 
0.98 3 3 1.38% 5.10% 0.0078 
      
0.98 4 2.25 1.38% 5.10% 0.0189 
0.98 4 2.5 1.38% 5.10% 0.0125 
0.98 4 2.75 1.38% 5.10% 0.0094 
0.98 4 3 1.38% 5.10% 0.0075 
      
0.98 5 2.25 1.38% 5.10% 0.0181 
0.98 5 2.5 1.38% 5.10% 0.012 
0.98 5 2.75 1.38% 5.10% 0.0090 
0.98 5 3 1.38% 5.10% 0.0072 
Our elaboration 
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
 
 
A) Derivation of equations (13) - (15). 
 
 
Now we see how we obtain equations (13) – (15) in the text. Barberis and 
Huang (2009) show that from the general maximization problem with n  assets, if 
we suppose that a) asset 1 is the risk-free asset, b) the gross risk-free return is the 
reference point for evaluating stock wealth fluctuations and c) 0
,
>tiθ  1>∀i , we get 
the two following first order optimality conditions (FOC):17 
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These expressions are obtained by using dynamic programming techniques. We 
note that equation (A1) is equation (10) in the text. In equation (A2) we have an 
indicator function, { }miI > , which means that we have 1 for values mi >  and 0 for 
values mi ≤ . Given the goal of investigating the equity premium and risk-free rate 
puzzles, as suggested by Barberis and Huang (2009), we do not fix a predetermined 
value for fr , a third condition is particularly useful: we obtain it by doing the 
“weighted” sum of equations contained in (A2), with the i-th equation weighted 
with ti,θ . We get what follows: 
 
 
                                                 
17
 We are also assuming that superscripts of the aggregator and certainty equivalence functions are equal to 
γ−1 . 
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Now, by considering that the model presented in the text has three assets and 
only one of them is narrowly framed (equity), equations (A2) and (A3) become as 
equations (11) and (12). We have 3=n , 2=m  and S=3 . Then, by exploiting 
assumptions 1 – 4 in the text, from equations (10) – (12) we get equations (13) – (15). 
Let’s start by equation (10). By substituting into this last expression the 
consumption growth rate, the total wealth return, and by using the other 
assumptions, we have: 
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values, after some steps we have 
 
          
γ
γ
εσγγγ
α
ββ
σγ
−
−+−+−












−
⋅⋅








=
+
1)1()1(
1
11 1,2
22
tCCC
C
C g
t
g
f eEeR          ⇒  
 
        ⇒        
γ
γ
σγγ
γ
γ
γσγ γγ
α
ββ
−
−
−
−














−







=
+−+−
1
2
22)1(1
12
22
)1(
1
11
C
C
C
C gg
f eeR     ⇒  
 
                          ⇒    2
2
1
1
1
1
11
C
eR f
γσγ
γ
γ
α
β −− 





−
=     ⇒  
 
                                    ⇒     
2
2
111 )1(1 CeR f
σγ
γ
γ
γβα −−− −=−                                         (A4)  
 
In solving expected values, as already pointed out in the text, we exploit the fact 
that if a random variable x  is distributed as a standard normal distribution, then 
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Hence, from (A4), after some simple steps, we get equation (13). 
Now we move to equation (11). By means of some algebraic passages is very 
easy to show that the first term on the right-hand side is equal to 
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Instead, we have to pay more attention to the second term on the right-hand side, 
i.e. the term with the expected value. For this term we have: 
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where we are using an indicator function and 
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Now we have to solve the four terms of the last expression. In doing so, 
solving the expected values with indicator functions is obviously necessary, and we 
do that by taking into account that, in general, 
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In our specific case we have: 
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By using the fact that ( ) 1 ( )N x N x= − −  and ( ) 1 ( )N x N x− = − , we can write 
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By combining equations (A5) and (A6) we get equation (14). For obtaining equation 
(15) starting from equation (12), we note that we have to simply calculate the 
expression for the first term of the right-hand side, since the second term contains 
the expected value of function )(•v  we have calculated above. The first term of the 
right-hand side is equal to 
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Finally, by combining (A6) and (A7) we get equation (15). 
 
 
 
B) Cumulative distribution and error functions. 
 
Let’s see some things about the expression )(⋅N  that we find in the three 
equations (13) – (15) in the text. It is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the 
standard normal distribution, and in our case it indicates the expected value of an 
indicator function, )(⋅v . In equations (13) – (15) we have that 
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where we have formalized what said above by using an indicator function. 
The cdf of the standard normal distribution is, by definition, 
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where  2
2
2
1)(
t
etf −=
pi
 is the standard normal density function. 
In solving the 3-equations model of the text, )(⋅N  is implemented in MatLab in 
function of the so-called erf (error function), because the MatLab recognizes such a 
kind of function and use it for solving numerically the relative equations. We can 
get the erf by multiplying times 2 the integral of the density function of a gaussian 
distribution with mean 0 and variance ½. We have: 
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Such a function has some properties that we will exploit next. 
What we are looking for is a way for writing down )(xN  as a function of 
)(xerf . We will find the solution by inverting a notorious relationship of 
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mathematical statistics, which gives us the possibility to write down the erf as a 
function of )(xN . The relationship is the following one: 
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Before inverting equation (B3), we verify such relationship by substitution. To this 
aim we substitute (B4) into the right-hand side of (B3), obtaining 
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Now we operate a change of variable within the integral. Let be 
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which implies 2zt = , dzdt 2=  and, for the change of the upper-bound of the 
integral, xzxzxt ≤⇒≤⇒≤ 222 . After some substitutions and simplifications 
into (B5), we have 
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Now, we exploit that  
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By substituting (B7) into (B6) we get 
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The last expression is obtained exploiting the fact that 
2ze−  is a symmetrical function 
divided in two parts by the vertical axis and hence the following relationship holds: 
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Once proved equation (B3), we invert it in order to write down )(xN  as a 
function of the error function. At the end, we will prove that 
 
                                    





+





=⇒−= 1
22
1)(1)2(2)( xerfxNxNxerf  
 
We have: 
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We can rewrite the last part of the right-hand side, ½, in a particular way, by using 
the following relationship (which holds because we are working with the standard 
normal distribution): 
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By substituting (B10) into (B9) we have: 
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Now we operate another change of variable, both in the first and second 
integral of the right-hand side of (B11). We have 
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2zt = , dzdt 2=  and, for the change of the upper-bound of the first integral, 
xzxzxt ≤⇒≤⇒≤ 222 . For the upper-bound of the second integral we have 
2
2 xzxzxt ≤⇒≤⇒≤ .18 By doing the relative substitutions into (B11) we get 
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By multiplying both sides times 2 and collecting terms we have: 
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Using equation (B8) we can rewrite (B12) as follows: 
 
                                                 
18
 The lower-bound remains zero. 
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but we can also rewrite it in the following way: 
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Finally, we have what we are looking for: 
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Equation (B13) is the expression used in solving (with MatLab) equations (13) 
– (15) in the three unknowns α , fR  and Sg  and equations (13) and (14) in the 
unknowns   and !". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Alessie, R., A. Lusardi, and M. Van Rooij (2007), “Financial literacy and stock 
market participation”, MRRC Working Paper 2007-162, University of Michigan. 
Barberis, N. and M. Huang (2001), “Mental accounting, loss aversion and individual 
stock returns”, Journal of Finance, 56, 1247-1292. 
Barberis, N. and M. Huang (2008), “The loss aversion/narrow framing approach to 
the equity premium puzzle”, in R. Mehra (ed), Handbook of the Equity Risk 
Premium, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Barberis, N. and M. Huang (2009), “Preferences with frames: a new utility 
specification that allows for the framing of risks”, Journal of Economic Dynamics 
& Control, 33, 1555-1576. 
Barberis, N., M. Huang and T. Santos (2001), “Prospect theory and asset prices”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1-53.  
Barberis, N., M. Huang and R. Thaler (2006), “Individual preferences, monetary 
gambles, and stock market participation: a case for narrow framing”, American 
Economic Review, 96, 1069-1090. 
Barberis, N. and R. Thaler (2003), “A survey of behavioral finance”, in G. 
Constantinides, M. Harris e R. Stulz (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 
North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Benartzi, S. and R. Thaler (1995), “Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium 
puzzle”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 75-92. 
Berkelaar, A., R. Kouwenberg and T. Post (2004), “Optimal portfolio choice under 
loss aversion”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 86, 973-987. 
Brown, S., W. Goetzmann and S. Ross (1995), “Survival”, Journal of Finance, 50, 853–
873. 
Campbell, J.Y. (2003), “Consumption-based asset pricing”, in G. Constantinides, M. 
Harris and R. Stulz  (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
Campbell, J.Y. and J.H. Cochrane (1999), “By force of habit: A consumption-based 
explanation of aggregate stock market behavior”, Journal of Political Economy, 
107, 205-251. 
Epstein, L. and S. Zin (1989), “Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior 
of consumption and asset returns: A theoretical framework”, Econometrica, 57, 
937-968. 
Epstein, L. and S. Zin (1991), “Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior 
of consumption and asset returns: An empirical investigation”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 99, 263-286. 
Faiella, I. and A. Neri (2004), “La ricchezza delle famiglie italiane e americane”, Temi 
di Discussione, n. 501, Banca d’Italia. 
Gabaix, X. (2008), “Discussion: The loss aversion/narrow framing approach to the 
equity premium puzzle”, in R. Mehra (ed), Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, 
North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
 39 
Gomes, F. (2005), “Portfolio choice and trading volume with loss-averse investors”, 
Journal of Business, 78, 675-706. 
Guiso, L. (2009), “A test of narrow framing and its origin”, EUI working paper 
2009/02, European University Institute, Fiesole. 
Haliassos, M. and C. Hassapis (2001), “Equity culture and household behavior”, 
working paper, University of Cyprus. 
Jorion, P. and W. Goetzmann (1999), “Global stock markets in the twentieth 
century”, Journal of Finance, 54, 953-980. 
Kahneman, D. (2003), “Maps of bounded rationality: psychology for behavioral 
economics”, American Economic Review, 93, 1449-1475. 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect theory: an analysis of decision 
under risk”, Econometrica, 37, 263-291. 
Kocherlakota, N. (1996), “The equity premium: It’s still a puzzle”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 34, 42-71. 
Ljungqvist, L. and T. Sargent (2004), Recursive macroeconomic theory, Mit Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Magi, A. (2007), “Razionalità limitata, scelte di portafoglio e investimento azionario 
estero”, Moneta e Credito, 60, 141-171. 
Magi, A. (2009), “Portfolio choice, behavioral preferences and equity home bias”, 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 501-520. 
Mehra, R. (2008), “The equity premium puzzle: a review”, in Foundations and Trends 
in Finance, 1-81. 
Mehra, R. and E. Prescott (1985), “The equity premium: a puzzle”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 15, 145-161. 
Mehra, R. and E. Prescott (2008), “The equity premium: ABCs”, in R. Mehra (ed.), 
Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Rabin, M. (1998), “Psychology and Economics”, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 11-
46. 
Rabin, M. (2002), “A perspective on psychology and economics”, European Economic 
Review, 46, 657-685. 
Reis, R. (2005), “Monetary policy for inattentive economies”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 52, 703-725. 
Simon, H. (1982), Models of bounded rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge (USA). 
Sims, C. (2003), “Implications of rational inattention”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
50, 665-690. 
Slovic, P. (1972), “Psychological study of human judgment: implications for 
investment decision making”, Journal of Finance, 27, 779-799. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981), “The framing of decisions and the psychology 
of choice“, Science, 211, 453-458. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1992), “Advances in prospect theory: cumulative 
representation of uncertainty”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. 
Weil, P. (1989), “The equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle”, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 24, 401-421. 
 
